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FROM SWIFT to ERIE: AN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE
Gene R Shreve*
HARMONY & DISSONANCE: THE SWIFT & ERIE CASES IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM. By Tony Freyer. New York and London: New
York University Press. 1981. Pp. xv, 190. $22.50.
The content of Professor Freyer's book is both familiar and new.
The cases have been the subjects of extensive commentary. Sw!ft v.
1yson1 precipitated a massive amount of literature.2 Erie RR v.
Tompkins, 3 the case that overruled Sw!ft, was once "the 'Pole Star'
of contemporary legal scholarship" and remains a "star of the first
magnitude in the legal universe."4 Freyer supplements the literature
by concentrating in detail on the historical context surrounding the
two cases and related events during the nearly one hundred years
that separated them. He makes some interesting suggestions about
where these facts might lead, but the book is, overall, refreshingly
undoctrinaire. And, while Freyer is not the first to treat the subject
from an historical perspective, 5 enough of his work is both new and
interesting6 to justify the reader's time.
The Supreme Court held in Sw!ft v. Tyson, a federal diversity
case, that it was not required by the Rules of Decision Act7 to follow
* Associate Professor of Law, New York Law School. LL.B. 1968, LL.M. 1975 Harvard
University. - Ed.
1. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
2. See, e.g., the authorities reviewed by Freyer at pp. 110-20.
3. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
4. Wes ten, After "L!fe for Erie" -A Reply, 18 MICH. L. REV. 971, 971 (1980) (quoting B.
ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 272 n.4 (1977)).
5. See the discussion of M. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 17801860 (1977) and R. BRIDWELL & R. WHITTEN, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE COMMON LAW:
THE DECLINE OF THE DOCTRINES OF SEPARATION OF POWERS AND FEDERALISM (1977), at
notes 23-28 infra.
6. In chilling obiter dictum, Judge Kaufman once observed that a party before him was
"very much in the position of the proverbial disappointed author: much of what he wrote was
interesting, and much original; but what was interesting was not original, and what was original was not interesting." Ionian Shipping v. British Law Ins. Co., 426 F.2d 186, 190 (2d Cir.
1970). Professor Freyer has clearly escaped this fate.
7. The statute was enacted as§ 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789. At the time of Swfft it
provided:
That the laws of the several states, except where the constitution, treaties or statutes of the
United States shall otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in
trials at co=on law in the courts of the United States in cases where they apply.
1 Stat. 92 (1789). In slightly amended form, the statute is now found at 28 U.S.C. § 1652
(1976).
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New York state judicial decisions concerning the law of negotiable
instruments. The common law of the New York state courts may
not have been clear on the point before the Court, 8 but that was not
the reason for the decision. Writing for the Court, Justice Story
stated that, at least with regard to "contracts and other instruments
of a commercial nature," federal diversity courts were free to follow
their own best understanding of "the general principles and doctrines of commercial jurisprudence."9 In such cases, Justice Story
said, state judicial decisions to the contrary were not part of the
"laws of the several states" as that term was used in the Rules of
Decision Act. Hence, the Act's mandate that state laws be followed
"as rules of decision" did not apply. 10
Preyer's book is about the birth, growth, and demise of the Swift
doctrine. In it he examines successive attitudes about the proper relationship between the Rules of Decision Act - perplexing in and of
itself1 1 - and the law and policy of diversity jurisdiction. 12 Justice
Brandeis would eventually ask in Erie whether a narrow reading
that excludes state judicial decisions from "laws of the several states"
in the Rules of Decision Act would not put federal judges in the
untoward, if not unconstitutional, 13 position of displacing state substantive law with no greater claim to authority than that their diver8. Justice Story indicates that it was not, Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. at 17-18, and Freyer
agrees. P. 12. But see G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 32 (1977) (arguing that the
Court chose "to ignore an obvious solution to a simple case . . • .").
9. 41 U.S. at 19.
10. 41 U.S. at 18-19.
11. For an excellent survey of developments under the Rules of Decision Act from Swift to
the present, see C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 347-87 (4th ed. 1983). "No issue
in the whole field1offederal]urisprudence has been more difficult than determining the meaning of this statute." -Id. at 347.
12. Rul~s of Decision Act problems are conceivable when federal courts are exercising
other types of subject matter jurisdiction, see Note, The Competence ofFederal Courts to Formulate Rules of.Decision, 11 HARv. L. REv. 1084, 1087 (1964), but it has always been in diversity cases that hard questions concerning the applicability of state law arise, and the difficulty
of these questions is compounded by fundamental uncertainty concerning the purposes of diversity jurisdiction. See P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND
WECHSLER's THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 18-19 (2d ed. 1973); Kurland,
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, the Supreme Court and The Erie .Doctrine in .Diversity Cases, 61 YALE
LJ. 187, 195-96 (1957).
13. Writing of the Swift doctrine, Justice Brandeis stated:
If only a question of statutory construction were involved, we should not be prepared to
abandon a doctrine so widely applied throughout nearly a century. But the unconstitutionality of the course pursued has now been made clear and compels us to do so.
304 U.S. at 77-78. In failing to make the shape of the constitutional question clear in Erle or
since, the Court created a congenial climate for spirited theorizing and debate. See, e.g., Ely,
The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REv. 693 (1974); Friendly, In Praise of Erie and ofthe New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 383 (1964); Mishkin, Some Further
Last Words on Erie-The Thread, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1682 (1974); Note, The Competence of
Federal Courts to Formulate Rules of.Decision, 11 HARV. L. REv. 1084 (1964); Note, The Law
Applied in .Diversity Cases: The Rules of.Decision Act and the Erie .Doctrine, 85 YALE L.J. 678
(1976).
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sity jurisdiction had been invoked. However, as Freyer's book
makes clear, the issue was framed quite differently at the time of
Sw!ft.
Freyer's thesis is that ''the central question in Swfft v. Tyson involved commercial law rather than federal-state relations" (p. 36).
He notes that the only disagreement among the justices in Sw!ft is
evidenced in the concurring opinion of Justice Catron, who disagreed with a point in Story's negotiable instrument analysis (p. 17).
Freyer points out that this degree of harmony cannot be explained
by the suggestion that members of the Supreme Court were unfamiliar with the issue of federal versus state power at the time of Swfft.
On the contrary, he describes prior agitation over the propriety of
federal common law crimes, where assertions of "federal jurisdiction
threatened, Jeffersonians claimed, constitutional principles of limited
federal power." 14 By the time of Sw!ft, Freyer notes, a majority of
the Court was Jacksonian, 15 sharing with earlier Jeffersonians a preference for decentralization of power (p. 2). Yet in Sw!ft they agreed
with Story, a nationalist. 16 This was possible, argues Freyer, because
concern over the uncertainty of commercial transactions united nationalists and states' rights adherents alike. The author surveys the
legal, economic and political climate for commercial transactions at
the time of Sw!ft. Commercial credit was becoming increasingly important to the economic vitality of all sections of the country. It facilitated the growth of farmer and shopkeeper classes in the West
and South and of the merchant class in the East (pp. 7-9). Yet commercial law was plagued internally by doctrinal confusion (pp. 2325) and externally by hostility to the enforcement of debtor obligations exhibited by many state courts and st~te legislatures (pp. 2023). And, while not all Jacksonian Democrats shared Story's concern over the unsettled state of the country's commercial environment, 17 Freyer is convincing when he suggests that Sto'ry's·colleagues
14. P. 12. "Agitation over the issue continued until 1816 when a divided Supreme Court
disavowed any authority to create a federal criminal law." P. 12 (citing United States v. Coolidge, 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 612 (1816)). A full citation to Coolidge is missing from the book,
apparently due to an editorial error in mismatching footnotes to text. See pp. 2, 165. Further
discussion of Coolidge and the events leading up to it can be found in Note, Swtft v. Tyson
Exhumed, 19 YALE L.J. 284, 286-87 (1969). "[T]he effect of Coolidge was to resolve the doctrinal confusion; few later opinions even felt it necessary to state that federal courts had no
jurisdiction over crimes at common law." Id at 287 (footnote omitted).
15. They included "such Democratic stalwarts as Chief Justice Roger B. Taney and Justice
Peter V. Daniel." Pp. 2-3.
16. From his youth in Marblehead, Massachusetts and early law practice in Salem, Story
developed "a decidedly federalist interest in commerce." Teton, 17te Story of Swtft v. 'Iyson,
35 ILL. L. REv. 519, 522 (1941). As a congressman, Story acted in the interests of the businessmen and shipmasters in his district, winning "the inflexible contempt of Jefferson." Id Earlier a supporter of a federal common law of crimes, id at 523, Story's nationalist sentiments
were abundantly clear by the time of Swtft.
17. A "program of simplifying the law to bring judges under control, reduce the power of
lawyers, and increase the layman's ability to understand and deal with his own legal problems
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on the court, as well as many others favoring states' rights (pp. 18-19)
did.
In keeping with this view, Freyer suggests that Story drafted his
opinion so as best to cultivate the narrow strip of ground he held in
common with the Jacksonians. 18 He did not directly pose the issue
of how far the rival law-making authority of the federal courts extended. Instead, he framed the holding by characterizing the commercial law question as a matter of "general" law. From that
conclusion, he reasoned that the Rules of Decision Act did not require state decisions on point to be followed because application was
limited
to state laws strictly local that is to say, to the positive statutes of the
state, and the construction thereof adopted by the local tribunals, and
to rights and titles to things having a permanent locality . . . . It never
has been supposed by us, that the section did apply, or was designed to
apply, to questions of a more general nature, . . . . 19

Whatever the faults of the approach, bottoming the decision on a
characterization of the issue as one of general, rather than local, law
invoked "a distinction . . . which was familiar to antebellum lawyers and judges" and one which "did not of itself challenge the
states' rights values of [Justices] Daniel, Taney, and others" (p. 36).
Freyer finds support for his thesis in the manner in which Sw(ft v.
Tyson was received. He observes that the opinion was the subject of
favorable commentary concerning its commercial law analysis and
that no mention was made of Sw[ft's interpretation of the Rules of
Decision Act (pp. 17-18). Grant Gilmore reached a similar conclusion and offered a further perspective on Sw[ft:
The point about Sw!ft v. Tyson is that it was immediately and enthusiastically accepted. No one suggested that it was an unconstitutional
usurpation of power by power-crazed judges or that it was a trick
played by a wily Federalist justice on his unsuspecting Jacksonian colleagues . . . . On the contrary, the doctrine of the general commercial
law was warmly welcomed and expansively construed, not only by the
lower federal courts but by the state courts as well. For the next half
century the Supreme Court of the United States became a great commercial law court.20
Freyer's conception of Story's intent in Sw[ft stands up well, I
was loosely related to the Jacksonian ideology of the period." Note,supra note 14, at 300. This
is hardly compatible with the reverence displayed for ''the general principles and doctrines of
commercial jurisprudence" in Swfft. 41 U.S. at 19.
18. "Cotton planters such as [Justice] Daniel, as much as commercially oriented justices
like Story, understood the importance of uniform commercial rules to the smooth operation of
the antebellum credit system. Presented with a case that embodied no direct federal-state issue, the justices were free to decide the commercial questions accordingly." P. 43 (footnote
omitted).
19. 41 U.S. at 18 (emphasis added).
20. G. GILMORE, supra ~ote 8, at 33-34.
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think, against the theories of prior commentators. John Chipman
Gray's suggestion that Swift grew out of Story's "restless vanity" and
fondness for "glittering generalities"2I is no longer taken very seriously.22 The view of Story recently adopted by Morton Horwitz is
more interesting. Horwitz saw Swift as Story's "attempt to impose a
procommercial national legal order on unwilling state courts."23 In
a spirited reply, 24 Professors Bridwell and Whitten argue that Story's
opinion in Swift was intended only "to preserve the intentions and
expectations of the parties . . . against the assumed background of
general commercial practice."25 The views of Horwitz and Freyer
on Swift are quite opposed, with Freyer having the best of the argument. In part, this is because Horwitz's view does not provide a satisfactory means of explaining the acceptance of Story's Swift opinion
by his colleagues and the public. Freyer's view is closer to that of
Bridwell and Whitten. They differ, however, over the degree of coherence and stability that commercial law had attained at the time of
Swift. Freyer's view, that commercial law was essentially unclear,
seems more convincing.26 Insofar as Horwitz contends that Swift was
shaped to suppress the populist underclass, 27 while Bridwell and
Whitten contend that the opinion was intended to honor "longstanding and widely accepted principles of private international jurisprudence that were called general commercial law,"28 their views are
sharply antagonistic. At the same time, these opposing views seem
to share the assumption that Swift can be explained by the monolithic influence of one idea at the time of decision. I think Freyer's
book disproves that possibility. He is convincing in suggesting that
Swift evolved from, and was made possible by, a climate of uncertainty. And, quite apart from what Story may have desired, 29 it was
21. J. GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 253 (2d ed. 1938).
22. Professor Gray's view is discussed and dismissed as "that of an amateur psychologist"
in Teton, supra note 16, at 526.
23. M. HORWITZ, supra note 5, at 250.
24. "Certainly, it is apparent that no desire to force a national procommercial jurisprudence on the stat«:5 was behind the Sw[ft decision." R. BRIDWELL & R. WHITTEN, supra note
5, at 95.
25. Id at 90.
26. At the same time, it is difficult to excuse Freyer's failure, despite his frequent references
to Horwitz's work, pp. 1, 2, 165, 167, 170, 171, to grapple with his arguments, and Freyer's
failure to give more than superficial attention, p. 165, to Bridwell and Whitten's work.
27. Reviewing Horwitz's earlier writing on this theme, Professor Holt observed:
In noting the darker side of the intimacy between instrumentalist judges and entrepreneurs, he emphasizes that the law not only facilitated but cemented and protected the
enlargement of the political power of the capitalist class.
Holt, Now and Then: The Uncertain State of Nineteenth-Century American Legal History, 1
IND. L. REv. 615, 624 (1974).
28. R. BRIDWELL & R. WHITTEN, supra note 5, at 70.
29. Freyer does not appear to question the conventional view that a unified body of commercial law was hoped for under Sw[ft' see, e.g., L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW
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impossible that he could have foreseen, much less orchestrated, the
effects the Sw!ft doctrine would ultimately have. Story's nationalist
reveries never led him to suggest that federal courts had anything
approaching exclusive jurisdiction over commercial law cases. 30 It
was only after postbellum changes in the scope and application of
federal diversity jurisdiction that massive inroads on the concurrent
jurisdiction of state courts became possible.31
As the force of Sw!ft as a commercial precedent declined, it began to take on a new and more disturbing significance. Discussion of
"general" and "local" law in Sw!ft left many points of law unaccounted for and usually it was the general law category into which
new problems were placed.32 Even more troublesome was the tendency of tlie Supreme Court to displace state law even within the
sanctuary of "local" matters originally defined in Sw!ft. 33 The Sw!ft
doctrine, though it never was without champions, grew increasingly
unpopular. The formalistic jurisprudence of characterization - exemplified by the supposed distinction between general and local law
- was to face growing skepticism in the twentieth century.34 The
problems with Sw!ft, however, went deeper than jurisprudential
style.
The "general law" exception to the Rules of Decision Act led to
the creation of an expanding body of general federal common law.
Corporations, an enormous new class of litigants,35 regarded the difference between rights conferred under general federal common law
and those recognized by state courts as an advantage. 36 Through
judicious selection of the place of incorporation (pp. 102-10), a corporation was frequently able to insure that suits by or against it
would be litigated by a federal court exercising its diversity jurisdic231 (1973), or that Story might have gone further than his opinion in Swift to achieve a kind of
national/aw merchant ifhe could have taken the Court with him. P. 13;seealso note 16supra.
30. See pp. xv, 25.
31. See notes 35-37 infra and accompanying text.
32. Preyer's discussion of the phenomenon in bond and torts cases is particularly interesting. Pp. 58-72.
33. The most significant example was the removal of state cases interpreting state statutes
or constitutions from the preserve of "local" law created by Swift. See note 19 supra and
accompanying text. Four of these cases, Rowan v. Runnels, 46 U.S. 134 (5 How.) (1846),
Watson v. Tarpley, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 517 (1855), Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 68 U.S. (1
Wall.) 175 (1863), and Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U.S. 20 (1882), are discussed both by Freyer,
pp. 48, 51, 58, 61, and Jackson, The Rise and Fall of Swift v. Tyson, 24 A.B.A. J. 609, 611-13
(1938).
34. See, e.g., Morse, Characterization: Shadow or Substance, 49 CoLUM. L. REV, 1027
(1949) (criticism of characterization in conflict of laws).
35. Specialized middlemen, who were the primary co=ercial creditors at the time of
Swift, had, by 1870, given way to corporate entities. P. 56.
36. Pp. 56, 110; see a/so J.W. HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW - THE LAW
MAKERS 190 (1950); Teton, supra note 16, at 529-30.

February 1984)

Harmony & Dissonance

875

tion. 37 The most famous example of this manipulative use of Sw!ft
doctrine and federal diversity jurisdiction was in Black and White
Taxicab and Transfer Co. v. Brown and Yellow Taxicab and Transfer
Co. 38 In this federal diversity proceeding, the Supreme Court permitted the plaintiff to enforce in Kentucky a contract which under
Kentucky state law was void as against public policy. Originally,
plaintiff and defendant had both been Kentucky corporations.
Plaintiff created federal diversity jurisdiction before suit by dissolving the Kentucky Corporation and reincorporating in Tennessee. It
has been suggested that the facts of Black and White Taxicab were so
blatant that it was open to the Supreme Court to refuse jurisdiction
without renouncing Sw!ft. 39 It may have been better, however, for
the case to have been decided the way it was, for the egregious facts
of the case and the "enormous criticism" (p. 105) that the decision
evoked may have had a purgative effect upon the Court. Erie was to
follow in a decade.40 Meanwhile, "the Court drew back from further
extensions of the Sw!ft doctrine" (p. 106). Finally, Black and White
Taxicab provided Justices Holmes, Brandeis and Stone an opportunity to join in the last and most famous of a line of principled and
visionary dissents which were to herald the coming of Erie. 41
Though the outline of events between Sw!ft and Erie was already
understood, Freyer contributes something by pulling information
heretofore found in scattered sources into a single narrative. However, his more interesting and original contributions at this point of
the book are his suggestions concerning how changing conceptions
oflaw and sources oflegal authority contributed to the criticism and
eventual demise of the Sw!ft doctrine. It is at least arguable that
Sw!ft sought to secure for federal judges no more than a view of
general principles of law unobstructed by conflicting state judicial
precedents. Freyer suggests that this conception began to seem
amorphous and, to some, disingenuous only when,
after the Civil War, the metaphysical foundation of the belief in gen37. In 1875, corporations were aided by congressional enlargement of the scope of general
diversity jurisdiction and removal. P. 55.
38. 276 U.S. 518 (1928)
39. C. WRIGHT, supra note 11, at 351. It is important to remember that, when Erie did
overrule Sw[fi, it deprived corporations of their greatest gain from manipulating diversity jurisdiction but did not bar the manipulation itself. Finally, in 1958, Congress acted to stem
these abuses by extending the citizenship of a corporation to the additional state, if any,
''where it has its principal place of business." 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1976). See C. WRIGHT,
supra note 11, at 129.
40. Black and While Taxicab was exhibit "A" in Brandeis's indictment of the Sw[fi doctrine. 304 U.S. at 73.
·
41. See Freyer's discussions of Justice Field dissenting in Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v.
Baugh, 149 U.S. 368 (1893), pp. 69-70; Miller dissenting in Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 68
U.S. (1 Wall) 175 (1863), pp. 59-60; and Holmes dissenting in Muhlker v. N.Y. & Harlem
R.R., 197 U.S. 544 (1905), Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349 (1910), and Southern
Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917), pp. 102-04.
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eral standards back of all legal rules seems to have been eroded. Undermining this belief was a growing perception that legal principles
were in fact nothing more than doctrines found in the local law of the
state, or in the national common law . . . . [Pp. 73-74].

Holmes may have said it best in his famous observation: "The common law is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky but the articulate
voice of some sovereign . . . ."42
What sovereign has or should have authority to create rules of
decision to govern federal diversity cases? Skirted in the Swift decision itself,43 this question had become a favorite both of those condemning the Swift doctrine and those defending it. The argument
that federal courts acting under Swift usurped state lawmaking authority was made forcefully in Supreme Court dissents,44 by members of academe (pp. 87-92) and in Congress (pp.78-81, 108-09). On
the other side of the debate, "the Court increasingly based its common-law authority" under the Swift doctrine "on constitutional principle" (p. 74). Some members of academe supported the
preeminence of federal sovereignty as well (p. 118-19).
Erie v. Tompkins overruled Swift's interpretation of the Rule of
Decision Act. Justice Brandeis stated:
Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of
Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State. And
whether the law of the State shall be declared by its Legislature in a
statute or by its highest court in a decision is not a matter of federal
concern. There is no federal general common law.45

Freyer spends relatively little of the book focusing upon the
42. Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222, (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting),
quoted by Freyer, p. 104. Story, of course, would have regarded the common law of commercial transactions as a felicitous omnipresence in the sky.
43. See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
44. See note 41 supra and accompanying text.
45. 304 U.S. at 78. Of course, Justice Brandeis did not suggest that federal courts should
entirely give up making common law. "[T]he same justice the same day in another case
pointed out that there may be questions of 'federal common law' upon which state statutes and
decisions cannot be conclusive, such as the apportionment between two states of the water of
an interstate stream." Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of
Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YALE L.J. 268, 273 (1946) (citing Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry
Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938)).
While Freyer clearly grasps the distinction between federal general common law and federal common law, see pp. xv, 25, he is not always careful to observe it in the book, referring to
federal general common law as "federal common law," see pp. 94, 107. Moreover, he overstates the importance of the true federal common law which survived Erie, suggesting it has
become a centralizing force which threatens "to overturn the decentralist intent of the Erie
opinion . . . ." P. xv. Instances of Supreme Court creation of federal common law have been
episodic and undisciplined. See Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47
CoLUM. L. REv. 527 (1947); Jackson, Full Faith and Credit - The Lawyer's Clause of the
Constitution, 45 CoLUM. L. REv. 1 (1945). But see Friendly, supra note 13, at 408-21. In a
series of recent cases, the Supreme Court expressed reservations about adopting an expansive
view of the lawmaking power of the federal judiciary. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S.
304 (1981); Texas Industries v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630 (1981); Middlesex County
Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Assn., 453 U.S. l (1981).
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Court's decision in Erie (pp. 129-53). This may be, in part, because
virtually every aspect of Erie - for example, the true importance of
Professor Warren's research,46 or the choice between the approaches
of Brandeis and Reed to overruling Sw!ft 47 - has been so thoroughly explored before. Part of the reason may also be Preyer's apparent interest in winding the book up without proceeding to
questions concerning application of the Rules of Decision Act which
have plagued courts and commentators since Erie.
When I :finished the book I found the chronological point at
which Freyer chose to end it premature and arbitrary. Do not contemporary questions about Erie's reach also set up, to use Preyer's
words, a "tension between harmony and dissonance" touching "the
very essence of American Federalism," concerning "a determination
of the limits of power of state and national government" (p. 160)?
On further reflection, and in fairness to Freyer, I think the answer is
no.
It is certainly true that in hard cases today under the Rules of
Decision Act, Erie, alone, is of little help. What does the federal
diversity judge do when the meaning of state law is unclear? 48 When
state law and a federal rule of civil procedure conflict?49 When
46. In part, Brandeis based his attack on Swift on Charles Warren's research and argument
that Story had misconstrued the original purpose of the Rules of Decision Act. Warren, New
Light on the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 31 HARV. L. R.Ev. 49, 51-52, 81-88, 108 (1923).
Brandeis's partial reliance on the article was to cast a slight shadow over Erie, since Warren's
methods and conclusions were, in time, roundly attacked. See, e.g., the critics cited at p. 178
n.21 . For a particularly lucid critique of Warren's position, see A. voN MERREN & D.
TRAUTMAN, THE LAW OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS: CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONFLICT OF
LAWS 1033-34 (1965).
Freyer provides the conventional view of this episode. Pp, 111-13. His more original contribution is to suggest elsewhere in the book how longstanding was the alliance of academics
and Court skeptics of Swift. Holmes had allied himself with Charles Warren in his dissent in
Black and White Taxicab. P. 105. Earlier, in Kuhn, Holmes had allied himself with John
Chipman Gray's attack of Swift. P. 103.
47. The debate concerned whether allusions to the constitutional infirmity of the Swift
doctrine, see note 13 supra, were necessary in order to overrule Swift's reading of the Rules of
Decision Act. Concurring separately, Reed thought they were not. 304 U.S. at 90-92. It has
been assumed that Brandeis couid bring himself to overrule a prior settled interpretation of a
congressional enactment (and, with it, overrule hundreds, if not thousands, of general federal
common law precedents) only by entertaining the prospect of a constitutional question. See E.
LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION To LEGAL REASONING 56-57 (1948); Friendly, supra note 13, at 392.
On the use of such an argument to broaden judicial powers of statutory interpretation, see
Kurland,supra note 12, at 204. Interestingly, Freyer gives Justice Stone considerable credit for
shaping Brandeis's approach in handling Erie's constitutional law dimension. Pp. 138-39.
48. Judge Clark found problems posed ''where the state law is confused or nonexistent" to
be "the most troublesome" aspect of Erie. Clark, supra note 45, at 290. Judge Clark's fear
that federal courts would be constrained by Erie, id. at 290-91, has not always been realized.
The willingness of federal courts to leap into the breach is exemplified in Mason v. American
Emery Wheel Works, 241 F.2d 906 (1st Cir. 1957) (district court not obligated to apply state
law to determine tort liability where state supreme court had indicated a willingness to revise
the prevailing rule). But there is no clear guidance available from Erie or succeeding Supreme
Court cases and the problem remains perplexing.
49. Supreme Court opinions grappling with such conflicts, e.g., Ragan v. Merchants Trans-

878

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 82:869

choice-of-law and change-of-venue issues combine?50 But these and
other contemporary questions belong to the era begun by Erie, while
Freyer's book treats the era which Erie at long last brought to an
end: the reign of Sw!ft v. 'lyson. Henry Hart aptly described the
difference:
The Erie case left in its train many unresolved questions . . . . But the
questions were left to be resolved as questions only of choice between
state law and federal law. The case put a period, with an exclamation
point, to the notion that the decisional rules of the state courts had a
status inferior to state statutes in the spheres, whatever they were, in
which state law govemed.51

It was not unreasonable for Freyer to place the last period in his
manuscript at about the same place. Policies of federalism may
figure in the contemporary resolution of post-Erie issues but the politics of federalism have become inaudible. Federal courts no longer
do much, if any, violence to state substantive law. 52 Erie marks the
boundary line and Freyer is justified in not taking his readers across.

fer and Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949), Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965), Walker v.
Armco Steel Corporation, 446 U.S. 740 (1980), have been less than clear and not altogether
consistent. For thoughtful but distinctly different responses to the problem compare M. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 169-203
(1980) (arguing for a balancing test under the Rules of Decision Act), with Ely, supra note 12
(arguing for the acco=odation of cases within the Rules Enabling Act).
50. After Erie, there was a brief uncertainty whether choice-of-law rules for federal courts
sitting in diversity were still permissible or whether they were part of the general co=on law
Erie had invalidated. The Supreme Court determined them to be the latter in Klaxon Co. v.
Stentor Electric Mfg., 313 U.S. 487 (1941). Analytic problems have greatly taxed federal
courts in administering the Klaxon rule. Difficulties in ascertaining state law, see note 48
supra, can be particularly acute when federal judges attempt to ascertain state choice-of-law
rules. This is due in part to the inherent difficulty of choice-of-law doctrine and in part due to
inconsistency in state choice of law brought about by local bias. See Shreve, In Search of a
Choice-of-Law Reviewing Standard-Reflections on Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 66 MINN.
L. REV. 327, 339 n.63 (1982).
Klaxon problems are aggravated in transfer-of-venue cases. While it is now settled that the
state choice-of-law rule of the transferor forum is generally to be applied, Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964), the troublesome questions remain whether Van ./Jusen should be
followed in transfers under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)(1976) when plaintifl's case clearly would have
been dismissed onforum non conveniens grounds ifhe had filed in the state court of the transferor forum. To follow Van ./Jusen in such a case would appear to give plaintiff unfair leverage
in shopping for favorable conflicts law. Yet this was the result In re Air Crash Disaster at
Boston, Mass., 399 F. Supp. 1106 (D. Mass. 1975).
51. Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 CoLUM. L. REV. 489, 506
(1954).
52. After Justice Frankfurter's stem lecture in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99
(1945), distinctions betwen substance and procedure are usually attempted with a certain trepidation. Nonetheless, it seems clear that intrusions upon expressions oflocal policy reflected in
state rules of liability, intrusions represented by Swift and continuing through Black and White
Taxicab, were largely, if not completely, snuffed out by Erie.

